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MAKING RULES AND UNMAKING CHOICE:
FEDERAL CONSCIENCE CLAUSES, THE
PROVIDER CONSCIENCE REGULATION, AND
THE WAR ON REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
One could eventually get to the point where the man who mines the
iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a factory to
make instruments used in abortions could refuse to work on consci-
entious grounds.1
In California, a physician refused to perform intrauterine insemina-
tion 2 on a woman after learning that she was a lesbian. 3 In New
Jersey, a labor and delivery nurse refused to help save the life of a
pregnant woman who was "standing in a pool of [her own] blood"
because the fetus was not expected to survive the necessary proce-
dure.4 In Wisconsin, a pharmacist refused to fill a customer's prescrip-
tion for birth control pills and then, after the customer traveled to
another pharmacy to obtain her medication, refused to relay the infor-
mation necessary for the willing pharmacist to fill the prescription. 5
And in Illinois, an ambulance driver refused to transport a pregnant
woman who was suffering from abdominal pain to a nearby abortion
clinic. 6
Whether the law should allow healthcare workers to refuse to pro-
vide care, or protect the rights of the patients to receive care, and
under what circumstances, is a question that has been vigorously de-
1. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive
Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 58 (2008) (quoting 41 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 478
(1976)).
2. Intrauterine insemination is a fertility treatment in which semen is inserted into a patient's
uterus through a catheter. See N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County
Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 963 (Cal. 2008).
3. Id. The physician asserted that her refusal to treat the patient was based on the patient's
unmarried status, rather than her sexual orientation. Id. at 963 n.I. California courts have inter-
preted the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the state's anti-discrimination statute, as prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation, but have not held that the law prohibits discrimination based
on marital status. See id. at 962-63.
4. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
5. Noesen v. State Dep't of Regulation and Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 751 N.W.2d
385, 389 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
6. Li Fellers, Ambulance Firm Faces Bias Suit, Worker Fired After Refusing to Go to Abortion
Clinic, CHI. TmB., May 9, 2004, § 4, at 3.
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bated since Roe v. Wade7 was decided. 8 Recent controversies over
refusals by pharmacists to dispense contraceptives and by hospital
staff to assist in the termination of life-sustaining treatment have rein-
vigorated the debate. 9 And in December 2008, during the last few
days of former President George W. Bush's term in office, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated a
new federal regulation1 ° that further fueled both sides of this debate
and brought conscience clauses,11 the laws that regulate these rights
and refusals, into the national spotlight.12
The Provider Conscience Regulation (PCR) 13 was ostensibly de-
signed to implement existing federal conscience clauses.1 4 Although
the new regulation purports merely to clarify existing laws, the broad
language used in the PCR does little to clarify the law and may even,
as this Comment will argue, expand opportunities for providers to re-
fuse to provide care. 15 Furthermore, the PCR overlaps and conflicts
with other federal laws and regulations. 16 While contraceptive ser-
vices are an apparent target of the regulation's supporters, the PCR
implicates all potentially controversial healthcare services, including
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute
that prohibited abortions except to save a woman's life. Id. In doing so, the Court for the first
time recognized a constitutionally protected "right of privacy," explaining that
[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.
Id. at 153. The Court held, however, that the right to abortion is not absolute, and it adopted a
trimester framework for evaluating the constitutionality of laws regulating abortion. Id. at 154,
162-64. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic holding of Roe, but it replaced the trimester framework
with the undue burden test. Id. at 879.
8. See Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D.C. Mont. 1973). The plaintiff in this
case, decided shortly after Roe v. Wade, sought an injunction against a hospital that had refused
to allow its facilities or staff to be used during a sterilization procedure. Id.
9. See Jennifer N. Willcox, Do Health Providers Have "Right to Refuse"? "Conscience
Clauses" Allow Hospitals to Opt Out of Abortions, Other Procedures, 35 CONN. L. TRIB. 19
(2009) (discussing legal and legislative efforts by advocates on both sides of the debate).
10. See David Stout, Medical "Conscience Rule" Is Issued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008,
11. I have chosen to use the term "conscience clauses," although I recognize that the favored
term among some supporters of reproductive rights is "refusal clauses."
12. See Willcox, supra note 9.
13. The full name of the regulation is "Ensuring That Department of Health and Human
Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of
Federal Law." 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2008) [hereinafter Provider Conscience Regulation].
14. See Rob Stein, Protections Set for Antiabortion Health Workers, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
2008, at Al.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
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end-of-life care; fertility treatment; and healthcare services for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.17
Opposition to the PCR has been vociferous. During the thirty-day
comments period that ran from the end of August 2008 to the end of
September 2008, over 90,000 individuals submitted comments oppos-
ing the PCR.18 During his election campaign, then-presidential candi-
date Barack Obama promised to revise the PCR, 19 and it is currently
under review by his Administration.20 In January 2009, seven states,
not content to wait for relief from the federal level, filed a lawsuit
challenging the PCR.2 1 At this time, however, the PCR remains in
effect, and unless it is significantly altered by the Obama Administra-
tion or invalidated by the courts, it promises to have a devastating
effect on the healthcare system.
The purpose of this Comment is threefold: to map the legal and
political contexts in which the PCR was promulgated, to propose a
theoretical framework within which conscience clauses may be effec-
tively analyzed, and to analyze the text and potential impact of the
PCR and the extent to which it conflicts with existing federal laws and
regulations. Underlying the discussion of these points is the norma-
17. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., THE HHS RULE ON PROVIDERS' RIGr TO REFUSE TO
PROVIDE HEALTH CARE: REACHING EVEN FURTHER THAN FAMILY PLANNING AND ABORTION
SERVICES 1 (2008), http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/HHS%20Rule%20Beyond%2OFamily%20Planning.
pdf (explaining that the Provider Conscience Regulation (PCR) could limit access to treatment
for infertility, depression, drug addiction, and HIV/AIDS); Critics: Proposed "Provider Con-
science" Regulation Threatens Public Health, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2008, http://www.advocate.com/
news-detail-ektid62434.asp (discussing the threat posed by the PCR to healthcare access for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals); Letter from Sharon L. Camp, President and
CEO, Guttmacher Inst., to the Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.
guttmacher.org/media/resources/2008/09/24/Guttmacherlnstitute-re-ConscienceRegulation.pdf
(explaining that the PCR could limit access to pap tests, treatment for sexually transmitted infec-
tions, blood transfusions, vaccinations, or end-of-life treatment); Letter from Richard F. Daines,
Comm'r, State of N.Y. Dep't of Health, to the Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 23, 2008),
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/pdf/press-0925085.pdf (explaining that the PCR could limit
access to end-of-life care, stem cell research, blood transfusions, vaccinations, treatment for
HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections, treatment for drug and alcohol addictions,
and stem cell research, as well as healthcare for immigrants without status, and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender individuals).
18. Press Release, Planned Parenthood, The Opposition Is Overwhelming but Will the Ad-
ministration Listen? (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/newsroom/press-re-
leases-5593.htm (select the title of the article from the list). See generally Regulations.gov, Your
Voice in Federal Decision-making, http://www.regulations.gov/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (provid-
ing access through a search engine to all comments submitted to HHS within the thirty-day
comments period).
19. See 7 States Sue Government over U.S. Abortion Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A14.
20. Rob Stein, Health Care Workers' "Conscience" Rule Set to Be Voided, WASH. POST, Feb.
28, 2009, at Al.
21. 7 States Sue Government, supra note 19.
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tive assumption that the right of the patient to receive unbiased infor-
mation and quality healthcare in accordance with her own needs and
beliefs should take precedence over the personal beliefs of the pro-
vider who is acting in his professional capacity.22 The Comment pro-
ceeds as follows. Part II provides some legal context; this Part surveys
federal conscience clauses and discusses several legal challenges to
them.23 Part III provides some political context by sketching the stage
on which the PCR debuted, and it argues that the PCR, even in its
revised version, is best understood as an effort to advance the goals of
the anti-contraception movement, whose members insist that contra-
ception is indistinguishable from abortion.24 Part IV first makes a
broadly applicable, theoretical argument that conscience clauses
should be understood to represent a zero-sum game in which the ben-
efit lost is not services but access to services.25 Second, Part IV pro-
poses a simple framework for analyzing conscience clauses, examines
the actual text of the current regulation using this framework, and
finds that the PCR effects a shift toward a "facilitator model" of con-
science protection.26 Third, Part IV argues that the PCR overlaps and
conflicts with existing federal laws and with other federal
regulations.27
Although the current version of the PCR is on the chopping block
as this Comment goes to print, the issues raised here will remain rele-
vant to an analysis of the new version of the PCR and may also con-
tribute to the broader national debate over the appropriate scope of
conscience clauses.
II. MAPPING THE LEGAL TERRAIN: FEDERAL CONSCIENCE
CLAUSES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCONTENTS
The PCR is ostensibly an effort to implement existing federal con-
science clauses. To understand the PCR (or its potential successor), it
is therefore necessary to first examine the federal laws that currently
define the scope of legal protections for healthcare providers who re-
fuse to provide care. Section A of this Part introduces the federal
22. It is not the purpose of this Comment to make a normative argument in defense of limited
conscience clauses. For a persuasive argument that the needs of patients should take precedence
over the personal views of the healthcare provider, see Martha S. Swartz, "Conscience Clauses"
or "Unconscionable Clauses": Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 269 (2006).
23. See infra notes 30-80 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See infra Part IV.C.
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conscience clauses.28 Section B examines several legal challenges that
have been brought against them, largely without success. 29
A. Federal Conscience Clauses
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution
encompasses the right to have an abortion. 30 That same year, in Doe
v. Bolton-Roe's less well-known companion case-the Court struck
down other barriers to abortion access, but tacitly approved a Georgia
conscience clause that allowed "a physician or any other employee...
to refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the
abortion procedure. ' 31 The Doe opinion thus paved the way for what
would later become a tidal wave of state32 and federal legislation pur-
porting to protect the consciences of healthcare providers. 33 These
statutes have been the subjects of very serious criticisms, especially in
recent years.34 Most recently, the debate has focused on whether con-
science clauses should protect pharmacists who refuse to fill prescrip-
tions for daily contraceptives such as "the pill," or to dispense
emergency contraception (EC), colloquially known as "the morning
after pill."'35 The recent battle over EC brought the war over con-
science clauses into sharp relief. Most recently, the PCR, which was
ostensibly drafted to implement three federal conscience clauses,
28. See infra notes 28-58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973).
32. See GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SER-
VICES (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-RPHS.pdf (illustrating
diagrammatically the policies of all fifty states regarding refusals by healthcare providers to pro-
vide care that they find objectionable).
33. See Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The
Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 779, 784 (2007) ("Since 1973, the scope of refusal legislation has greatly expanded.").
34. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 22, at 277 ("The provision of medically indicated health care
should be the health care professional's primary responsibility, subordinating personal religious
or moral beliefs to the needs of patients.").
35. See, e.g., Nell 0. Kromhout, Crushed at the Counter: Protection for a Pharmacist's Right of
Conscience, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 265 (2007) (arguing for more stringent protections for phar-
macists who refuse to fill prescriptions); Nancy K. Kubasek, Daniel C. Tagliarina & Corinne
Staggs, The Questionable Constitutionality of Conscientious Objection Clauses for Pharmacists,
16 J.L. & POL'y 225 (2007) (arguing that broad state refusal clauses, such as that of South Da-
kota, should be struck down as unconstitutional); Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the Prescription: Why
Illinois' Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception
in the Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 399 (2006) (arguing in support of an Illinois executive
order that requires pharmacists to dispense contraceptives "without delay"). See generally In
Search of Plan C, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 2005, at 26 (discussing the increasing number of incidents
of pharmacists in the United States refusing to fill prescriptions for contraceptives).
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namely, the Church Amendment, 36 the Coats Amendment, 37 and the
Weldon Amendment, 38 shifted the focus of this debate from the state
level-where most battles over conscience protections have been
fought during the past few decades-to the national level.
Congress passed the Church Amendment in 1973 in response to
Roe v. Wade and a less well-known case decided the same year, Taylor
v. St. Vincent's Hospital.39 In Taylor, a Catholic hospital refused to
allow one of its doctors to perform a tubal ligation on a patient.40 The
prospective patient was a pregnant woman who was scheduled to de-
liver her child by cesarean section and wanted to undergo a tubal liga-
tion at the same time.41 Doing so would have allowed her to undergo
one surgery, rather than two, and thereby to avoid the unnecessary
risk of having a second operation. St. Vincent's Hospital was the only
hospital in the area with a maternity department and, therefore, the
only location at which the dual-purpose procedure could have been
performed. 42 The district court initially issued a preliminary injunc-
tion against the hospital, barring them from interfering with the doc-
tor's performance of the procedure. 43 The court reasoned that the
hospital was a state actor because it received federal funding and,
therefore, that denying the patient care was an infringement of her
rights under the Constitution.44 Congressional response to the Taylor
case was swift: the Church Amendment specifically disapproved of the
district court's conclusion, and the court was forced to dissolve the
injunction. 45
After subsequent revision, the Church Amendment now provides
several protections for entities receiving federal funds, as well as the
36. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2008).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2008). The PCR refers to the Coats Amendment as the Public Health
Service Act, of which the Amendment is part. See Provider Conscience Regulation, 45 C.F.R.
§ 88.1 (2008).
38. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1), 118 Stat. 2809,
3163 (2004).
39. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D.C. Mont. 1973); see Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hos-
pital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 135, 145-47 (2003).
40. See Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 949. Tubal ligation is the procedure used to sterilize women;
during tubal ligation, "both fallopian tubes are blocked by tying, sealing, or attaching a ring or
clip to them." American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, ACOG Education Pamphlet
AP035-Sterilization by Laparoscopy (Feb. 2003), http://www.acog.org/publications/patient-ed-
ucation/bp035.cfm.
41. See Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 949.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 951.
44. See id. at 950.
45. See id. at 950-51.
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employees of these entities. First, the Amendment prohibits courts
from using an individual's receipt of federal funds as a basis for re-
quiring that individual to perform or assist in the performance of
abortions or sterilization procedures. 46 Likewise, the Amendment
also prohibits courts from requiring an entity that receives federal
funds to allow its facilities or personnel to be used to provide abor-
tions or sterilization procedures. 47 Second, the Amendment provides
that a healthcare entity that receives federal funds cannot discriminate
against an employee or potential employee because she performed or
assisted in the performance of an abortion or sterilization procedure,
because she refused to do so, or on the basis of her "religious beliefs
or moral convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abor-
tions."' 48 Third, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this
analysis, the Individual Protection Clause (IPC) of the Church
Amendment states as follows:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the perform-
ance of any part of a health service program or research activity
funded in whole or in part under a program administered by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services if his performance or assis-
tance in the performance of such part of such program or activity
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions. 49
Like any statute, the scope of this provision depends on the precise
meaning of several key words. Most significantly, unlike the other
provisions of the Church Amendment, the IPC is not limited to abor-
tion and sterilization procedures.50 But other key words are less clear.
What is a "health care program," as the term is used here? What does
it mean to "assist in the performance of"? These terms leave much
room for interpretation, and for decades, this space has remained
largely unfilled by courts or federal agencies. The PCR is controver-
sial because it answers these questions in a way that favors protecting
provider refusals over patient rights.
In the three decades following the passage of the Church Amend-
ment, Congress continued to develop federal conscience protections.
Passed in 1988, the Danforth Amendment provides that Title IX,
which prohibits sex discrimination in public schools and extracurricu-
lar programs, should not be interpreted by courts to require an indi-
vidual or healthcare entity to pay for or provide abortions.5 1 In 1996,
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2006).




51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2006); Wilson, supra note 1, at 50 & n.50.
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Congress passed the Coats Amendment, which prohibits discrimina-
tion against healthcare professionals and entities that refuse to receive
medical training in abortion services.52 And in 1997, Congress passed
laws providing that Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans are
not required to pay for counseling and referral services if the plan
"objects to the provision of such service on moral or religious
grounds. '53 The Medicare and Medicaid provisions are notable be-
cause they were the first federal laws to expand conscience protec-
tions beyond entities directly involved in the provision of care (for
example, doctors and hospitals) to encompass entities indirectly in-
volved in the provision of care (namely, payers). 54 This expansion is
significant for several reasons. Whereas a patient faced with an ob-
jecting provider can seek the same care from another provider, a pa-
tient faced with an objecting payer cannot simply use another payer-
instead, the patient must forgo the desired service unless she is able to
pay out-of-pocket, a result that illustrates the class dimensions of the
conscience clause debate. Furthermore, the recognition of objecting
payers as desirable candidates for protection marked an important
shift in the way federal policymakers delineated conscience protec-
tions: whereas earlier federal laws were concerned with entities and
individuals who wanted to avoid being personally involved in provid-
ing purportedly objectionable services, the Medicare and Medicaid
clauses effectively allow managed care plans to obstruct the perform-
ance of objectionable services by other individuals and entities.
Congress's newest contribution to federal conscience clause juris-
prudence is the Weldon Amendment. Passed in 2004, the Weldon
Amendment prohibits discrimination against any individual or entity,
including "an individual physician or other health care professional, a
hospital, a provider-sponsored organization, a health maintenance or-
ganization, a health insurance plan, or any other kind of health care
facility, organization or plan" that refuses to "provide, pay for, pro-
vide coverage of, or refer for abortions. ' 55 Notably, while the Weldon
Amendment applies to a broad range of both direct and indirect
healthcare providers, including payers, the potential breadth of the
Amendment is restricted on another front: protection extends only to
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2008).
54. JODY FEDER, CONG. RES. SERV., THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF ABORTION CONSCIENCE
CLAUSE LAWS 3 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocu-
ments/RS2142801142005.pdf.
55. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d), 118 Stat. 2809,
3163 (2004).
1256 [Vol. 59:1249
2010] MAKING RULES AND UNMAKING CHOICE
refusals related to abortions.56 With regard to individuals, the
Amendment merely protects refusals to "provide" this service,
thereby further restricting the scope of the Amendment by extending
protection to only those individuals who are in very close proximity to
the service. 57 On the other hand, the Amendment does not limit pro-
tection to religious objections; protection is extended to refusals made
on any grounds.58
B. Legal Challenges to Federal Conscience Clauses
The constitutionality of conscience clauses is an issue that has been
raised with some frequency both in the courts and in legal scholarship.
One author commented that conscience clauses fit into the "play in
the joints" 59 between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause. 60 Courts have held that conscience clauses are neither man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause nor forbidden by the Establishment
Clause.61 As recently as 2008, the California Supreme Court recog-
nized that "under the United States supreme court's most recent hold-
ings, a religious objector has no federal constitutional right to an
exemption from a neutral and valid law of general applicability on the
ground that compliance with that law is contrary to the objector's re-
ligious beliefs."' 62 The bedrock principle behind this legal conclusion,
frequently cited by courts adjudicating Free Exercise claims, is that
while "freedom of religious belief is absolute ... freedom of religious
conduct by its nature cannot be."'63 Conscience clauses give providers
the right to engage in certain conduct or, perhaps more accurately, to




59. Melissa Duvall, Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Constitutional Religious "Accom-
modations" or Unconstitutional "Substantial Burdens" on Women?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1485,
1502 (2006).
60. Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are contained in the First
Amendment, which reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
61. Swartz, supra note 22, at 327 ("[R]efusal clauses are neither constitutionally mandated by
the Free Exercise Clause, nor constitutionally forbidden by the Establishment Clause.") (citing
Katherine White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers' Beliefs and
Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1729-30 (1999)).
62. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959,
966 (Cal. 2008) (citing Employment Div. Ore. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990); accord Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S 520, 531 (1993)).
63. Patricia L. Selby, On Whose Conscience? Patient Rights Disappear Under Broad Protective
Measures for Conscientious Objectors in Health Care, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 507, 532 (2006)
(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
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would otherwise be a condition of employment. Thus, conscience
clauses are not statutory expressions or derivations of the constitu-
tional right to freedom of religion; instead, to the extent that they al-
low providers to engage in certain conduct, these clauses go beyond
the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.
On the other hand, courts have held that conscience clauses do not
constitute per se violations of the Establishment Clause. In a case
filed less than a year after the passage of the Church Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the Amendment,
reasoning that the purpose of the Amendment was to preserve the
government's neutrality in the abortion debate, not to affirmatively
promote one religious view over another.64 Notably, while the
Church Amendment specifically provides for the protection of indi-
viduals and entities whose objections are based on their "religious be-
liefs or moral convictions," a trend might be recognized among new
state conscience clauses, which now frequently omit any requirement
that objections be based on either religious or moral grounds.65 Some
commentators have observed that this expansion of protection has
even further insulated conscience clauses against successful challenge
under the Establishment Clause because, by their terms, these laws
protect personal objections as well as those based on the teachings of
organized religions.66
The Weldon Amendment has also survived several legal challenges.
In 2006, recipients of Title X, the federal program that funds family
planning services, challenged the Amendment. 67 The recipient groups
argued that the terms of the Amendment conflicted with Title X fund-
ing regulations, which require recipients to provide pregnant patients
with information regarding all of their reproductive options, including
abortion. 68 The recipients based their claim on the potential loss of
funding that would result if they failed to comply with their Title X
obligations in an effort to avoid violating federal law.69 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that any loss of
funding was hypothetical and rejected the challenge for lack of stand-
ing.70 However, taking a position that seems to validate the Title X
recipients' funding concerns, in HHS's response to comments that it
64. See Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. Swartz, supra note 22, at 293.
66. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 33, at 795.
67. See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n. v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
68. See id. at 828.
69. See id. at 829.
70. See id. at 831.
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received about the PCR, it notes that the Title X regulation that re-
quires recipients of federal funding to provide counseling and referrals
for abortion services "is inconsistent" with federal conscience laws
and with the PCR.71 The solution proposed by HHS in its response is
that the Title X counseling and referral requirement will no longer be
enforced. 72 The potential ramifications of this solution will be dis-
cussed below.73
In California v. United States, the state of California challenged the
Weldon Amendment.74 The state alleged that the Amendment-
which contains no explicit exception requiring medical personnel to
act as necessary in order to save lives during medical emergencies-
conflicted with a California law mandating the provision of medical
care in an emergency, including, when necessary, an abortion.7 5
Therefore, the state argued, the Weldon Amendment infringed on
state sovereignty. 76 In an opinion handed down in March 2008, a fed-
eral district court rejected the challenge, reasoning that, because the
Weldon Amendment was silent on the issue of emergency care, it
should be read in light of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act (EMTALA) 7 7-a federal law that requires the provi-
sion of emergency services-and on which the California state law is
based.78 Therefore, the district court concluded, the Weldon Amend-
ment did not conflict with state law.7 9
Thus, federal conscience clauses, although not mandated by the
Constitution, have withstood legal challenge in the courts. 80 With the
legal soundness of federal conscience laws repeatedly confirmed by
71. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,087 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 88 (2009)) (noting that the Title X requirement is "inconsistent with the health care
provider conscience protection statutory provisions and this regulation").
72. See id.
73. See infra notes 181-192 and accompanying text.
74. California v. United States, No. C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
18, 2008).
75. See id. at *1.
76. See id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (2006).
78. See California v. United States, 2008 WL 744840, at *4.
79. See id.
80. In contrast, reproductive rights advocates have had some success in challenging state con-
science clauses. In a case out of Alaska, for example, advocates argued that the state's con-
science clause violated the state constitution, which explicitly provides for a right of privacy. See
Valley Hosp. Ass'n. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Ala. 1997). The Alaska Su-
preme Court agreed, holding that quasi-public hospitals could not refuse to provide abortions.
Id. at 971-72. For a discussion of other state constitutions, the extent to which they embrace a
more explicit right to privacy than the federal constitution, and the resulting potential for using
state constitutions to increase access to reproductive healthcare, see Scott A. Moss & Douglas
M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive Rights, 88 B.U. L. REv. 175 (2008).
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courts, but their constitutional necessity denied with equal clarity, the
scope of these conscience clauses is left to depend largely on the out-
comes of political (some would say ethical) debates.
III. MAPPING THE POLITICAL TERRAIN: THE CONCEPTION OF THE
PCR AND THE ANTI-CONTRACEPTION MOVEMENT
In July 2008, a preliminary draft of the PCR was leaked on the In-
ternet.81 The draft explicitly defined the term "abortion" to include
any treatment that interfered with the implantation of a fertilized
egg. 82 Pro-choice advocates were stunned. 83 Contraceptives, includ-
ing emergency contraception and ordinary birth control methods such
as "the pill," work primarily to prevent fertilization, but they might
sometimes work to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg.84 Thus,
under the language of the leaked draft, commonly used birth control
methods such as "the pill" and intrauterine devices (IUDs), as well as
emergency contraception, would be considered "abortion," a result
that is radically at odds with medical, legal, and popular consensus on
the definition. 85
In response to widespread criticism of the leaked draft, HHS re-
vised the PCR and released an official draft in August 2008.86 In the
revised version, HHS abandoned any attempt to define the term
"abortion. '87 In response to questions about the omission, HHS Sec-
retary Michael Leavitt told reporters, "This regulation does not seek
to resolve any ambiguity in that area."'8 The medical community,
however, harbors no ambiguity over the meaning of the term "abor-
81. See Robert Pear, Abortion Proposal Sets Condition on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at
A17.
82. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Provider Conscience Regulation 16-17 (July 22, 2008),
http://www.rhrealitycheck.orglemailphotos/pdffHHS-45-CFR.pdf. Note that this is the unofficial
draft version of the regulation.
83. See Statement by Cecile Richards, President, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. (July 15,
2008), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/newsroom/ (select "Press Releases," then select
"Planned Parenthood: Proposed HHS Rule Would Compromise Women's Health Care").
84. See Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception: Is This the Beginning of the Next Culture War?,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2006, at 48, 53. Doctors do not know with certainty whether contra-
ceptives prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg. Id. The uncertainty is the result of two
obstacles to testing the hypothesis, namely, ethical problems associated with testing and the diffi-
culty of distinguishing statistically between the half of all fertilized eggs that naturally fail to
implant from those that may fail to implant as a result of the patient's contraceptive method. Id.
85. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman is Pregnant, 8
GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 7 (May 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/
08/2/gr080207.pdf.
86. See Stein, supra note 14.
87. Id. at A8.
88. Id.
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tion."89 And in fact, despite Secretary Leavitt's apparent confusion,
HHS unambiguously defined the term in a regulation that was
promulgated over thirty years ago and that is still in effect. In the
context of that regulation, which is related to funding for medical re-
search, HHS unambiguously stated, "Pregnancy encompasses the pe-
riod of time from implantation until delivery." 90  Under this
definition, birth control, which is ineffective after implantation, would
not be considered abortion.
The omission of a clear definition of the term "abortion" in the final
draft of the PCR does not, therefore, represent a neutral approach;
instead, it represents a desire to create an opportunity for modifica-
tion of the definition of "abortion" that is currently in place. Any
purported confusion over the term "abortion" is the product of the
anti-contraception movement's targeted campaign to redefine the
term "abortion" to encompass contraception 9' in order to, inter alia,
effect an increase in the scope of conscience clause protections. In
fact, redefining the term "abortion" has been a very serious goal of
the anti-contraception movement for many years. Two of the oldest
pro-life organizations, the Pro-Life Action League and the National
Right to Life Committee, both endorse the view that life begins at
fertilization. 92 The Pro-Life Action League and the American Life
89. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, GOVERNMENTS WORLDWIDE PUT EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION INTO WOMEN'S HANDS 2 (2004), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/
files/documents/pub -bp.govtswwec.pdf (explaining that, according to the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) and the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, pregnancy be-
gins at implantation, and therefore, emergency contraception is not an abortifacient); Jennifer
Johnsen, The Difference Between Emergency Contraception and Medication Abortion, in
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA FACT SHEET 1 (2006), http://www.planned
parenthoodaction.org/files/ecmedabl206.pdf (explaining that, according to several health organi-
zations, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), pregnancy begins at implantation, and
therefore, emergency contraception is not an abortifacient).
90. Letter from Family Planning Advocates of N.Y. State to the U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.regulations.gov/ (enter the following document iden-
tification number into the search box: HHS-OS-2008-0011-4949.1). In its letter to HHS, the
American Civil Liberties Union explained that Congress has always distinguished contraceptives
from abortion and has repeatedly rejected attempts to blur the distinction. See Letter from the
Wash. Legislative Office of the Am. Civil Liberties Union to the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. 6 (Sept. 25, 2008), http:llwww.aclu.orglimagestasset-upload file467_36942.pdf.
91. See, e.g., I11. Right to Life Comm., Study Confirms Plan B Is Abortifacient and Unreliable,
http://www.illinoisrighttolife.org/2007_2 PlanBunreliable.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (falsely
claiming that Barr Pharmaceuticals, the company that produces Plan B-the only version of the
morning after pill currently sold in the United States-has admitted that its product is an
abortifacient).
92. See Pro-Life Action League, Questions & Answers: When Does Life Begin?, http://prolife
action.org/faq/unborn.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (asserting that "[als far as observable science
is concerned, human life begins at conception"); Nat'l Right to Life Comm., When Does Life
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League actively oppose contraception; the latter group, one of the
largest pro-life groups in the United States, explains that "once fertili-
zation has taken place .... [a] new tiny person has been formed." 93
The Pro-Life Action League asserts, "One function [of emergency
contraceptives] is to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg. That's
abortion. ' 94 Some pro-life professional groups, including the Chris-
tian Medical and Dental Associations,95 Pharmacists for Life Interna-
tional,96 and the legal non-profit Americans United for Life, 97 have
also endorsed this view.
And some state legislatures have been persuaded. South Dakota's
conscience clause provides that "[n]o pharmacist may be required to
dispense medication if there is reason to believe that the medication
would be used to... [d]estroy an unborn child," which the law defines
as "an individual ... from fertilization until live birth." 98 According to
Missouri legislators, "The life of each human being begins at concep-
tion."99 And as recently as the last presidential election, the citizens
of Colorado voted on (but defeated) a constitutional amendment,
known as Amendment 48, that would have given fertilized eggs full
Begin?, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/wdlb/wdlb.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (claiming that "[a]
new individual human being begins at fertilization"). Although the National Right to Life Com-
mittee endorses the view that life begins at fertilization, the group states that it does not have an
official position on whether contraception is abortion. See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., Mission
Statement, http://www.nrlc.orglMissionstatement.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). Significantly,
the National Right to Life Committee (along with Americans United for Life) refused to sup-
port the defeated Amendment 48, discussed infra note 100 and accompanying text. See Sarah
Kliff, Roe v. Wade v. Kristi, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2008, at 14. Their refusals illustrate the deep
divisions within the broader pro-life movement over the contraception issue.
93. Am. Life League, Birth Control: The Abortion Connection (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.all.
org/article.php?id=10125.
94. Joe Scheidler, Action News Hotline, Pro-Life Action League (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.
prolifeaction.org/hotline/2005/1118.htm. Although emergency contraception is a favorite target
of the anti-contraception movement, no relevant distinction between emergency contraception
and ordinary birth control exists: both contain the same active ingredients and both may work to
prevent implantation of a fertilized egg. See Shorto, supra note 84, at 53.
95. See Shorto, supra note 84, at 53; see Christian Med. & Dental Ass'n, The Beginning of
Human Life, http://www.cmda.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTML
Display.cfm&ContentlD=3848 (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) ("The life of a human being begins at
the moment of fertilization .. .[and] the full moral worth afforded to every human being is
equally afforded from fertilization onward throughout development.").
96. See Pharmacists for Life Int'l, Plan B [Emergency Abortion Pill] FAQs, http://www.pfli.
org/main.php?pfli=planbfaq (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) ("Emergency Abortion drugs like Plan B
are abortifacient 75 to 89% of the time. Rarely will a drug like Plan B work to suppress ovula-
tion and truly prevent the meeting of the male and female gametes PRIOR to the moment of
conception.").
97. See Shorto, supra note 84, at 50.
98. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70(2) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (1998).
99. MO. STAT. ANN. § 1.205(1) (West 2006).
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constitutional rights.100 All of these legislative items effectively blur
the line between abortion and contraception.
Whether the former Bush Administration was sympathetic to the
movement's goals can generously be described as unclear. In 2005, a
reporter asked former Press Secretary Scott McClellan a seemingly
simple question: Does President Bush support contraception? 10 1 Mc-
Clellan dodged the question, and then, in response to the reporter's
persistence, blatantly stated that he would not answer.'02 Nor would
the former President respond to requests from members of the House
of Representatives for clarification on his views. 103 Notably, when the
PCR was first released, critics called it Bush's "final gift to the radical
right."' 0 4
Most disconcerting to reproductive rights advocates is the possibil-
ity that courts will be sympathetic to the movement's efforts to blur
the lines between abortion and contraceptives. To date, such attempts
have been almost uniformly rejected by the courts. But in 2001, a
federal district judge in Ohio issued a preliminary ruling that a state
law allowing healthcare professionals to refuse to provide "abortions"
could protect a pharmacist who had refused to dispense contracep-
tives.10 5 The court reasoned that the pharmacist's "subjective belief
that the particular medication caused what she believed to be abor-
tion" was sufficient to trigger protection under the law. 106 By allowing
the objecting provider to define the scope of her own rights under the
state conscience clause, this court introduced what could be described
as a "subjective test" into conscience clause jurisprudence. If adopted
by other courts, the introduction of a subjective test into this area of
100. Electa Draper, Amendment 48 "Personhood" Push Rejected, DENVER POST, Nov. 5, 2008,
at B4. Over 130,000 Coloradoans signed petitions to put the referendum on the ballot, but the
measure was defeated by a vote ratio of three-to-one. Id.
101. See Shorto, supra note 84, at 51.
102. See id. at 51, 53.
103. See id. at 53.
104. Jessica Arons, Last Chance to Fight Hypocritical and Deceptive HHS Rule, HUFFINGTON
POST, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-arons/last-chance-to-fight-hypo-b
128976.html.
105. JILL MORRISON, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., DON'T TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER: A
GUIDE TO PHARMACY REFUSAL LAWS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 10 (2005), available at http://
www.nwlc.org/pdf/8-2005_Don'tTakeNo.pdf (citing Brauer v. Kmart Corp., No. C-1-99-618 (S.D.
Ohio 2001)). Three other states-Delaware, Maryland, and Oregon-have laws that allow phar-
macists to object to providing treatment that will terminate a pregnancy, but which fail to pro-
vide a definition of pregnancy. Kubasek, supra note 35, at 232 n.18. This omission "permits
objecting pharmacists to use to their advantage the ambiguity of what constitutes 'termination of
pregnancy' . . . if a pharmacist believes pregnancy occurs at fertilization, the use of birth control
could be considered a termination of pregnancy." Id. at 232.




the law would turn conscience clauses into wildcards that objecting
providers could use in accordance with their own personal beliefs
about medicine and morality, without regard for legislative intent or
the rights of patients. Yet this is precisely the sort of "ambiguity" rec-
ognized by HHS in their comments regarding the definition of
abortion.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court opinion
that adopted what I have termed the subjective test approach to con-
science clause interpretation. Stormans v. Selecky involved a chal-
lenge to a state regulation that required pharmacists to fill
prescriptions for all medications, including contraceptives.10 7 The dis-
trict court concluded that the regulation violated pharmacists' rights
under the Free Exercise Clause.10 8 Applying strict scrutiny, the court
was not persuaded that the regulation served the compelling interest
of preventing sex discrimination.10 9 In making this argument, the in-
terveners sought to align this case with contraception jurisprudence,
which would have provided a stronger basis for their sex discrimina-
tion argument.110 Instead, the district court relied on Bray v. Alexan-
dria Women's Clinic, an abortion case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "the refusal to participate in an act that one believes
terminates a life has nothing to do with gender or gender discrimina-
tion." '111 The district court, citing Bray, articulated a similar test to
that used by the Ohio judge: "Whether or not Plan B acts as an aborti-
facient or terminates a pregnancy, to those who believe that life begins
at conception, the drug is designed to terminate a life. ' 112 The court
continued, "[The pharmacists'] objection to Plan B is not about gen-
der, it is about the sanctity of life as defined by their religious teach-
ings. ' 113 But the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that because the law
was neutral and generally applicable, it was valid under the Free Exer-
107. See Stormans v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1251, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
108. See id. at 1266.
109. See id. at 1263.
110. See Elizabeth Gerber, Emergency Contraception: Legal Consequences of Medical Classi-
fication, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 428, 429 (2008) ("Because the Supreme Court treats abortion
and contraception differently, doctrines around contraception have developed more robustly,
including well-established protections on the basis of sex discrimination.").
111. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 271-74 (1993)); Gerber, supra note 110, at 429-30 (discussing the significance of the district
court's decision to align this case, which dealt with emergency contraceptives, with abortion ju-
risprudence, rather than contraception jurisprudence).
112. Stormans, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
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cise Clause if the government could show that it was rationally related
to legitimate government interests.' 14
Thus, the battle over conscience protections and contraceptives has
been waged in the halls of state legislatures and in the courts. With
the promulgation of the PCR, this debate has reached the national
level. The leaked version of the PCR was a blatant attempt to rede-
fine abortion to encompass contraception, but this attempt has been
abandoned. Nonetheless, the possibility that the use of contraceptives
will be redefined as "abortion," whether by legislatures, courts, or fed-
eral agencies, remains a real threat.1 5 And although the new version
of the PCR omits this controversial language, the political context in
which the PCR was proposed and finally promulgated remains rele-
vant to the analysis of the final version. In addition, this discussion
raises questions about the extent to which ambiguous language can
accomplish the goals of the anti-contraceptive movement and other
advocates of broad refusal rights." 6
IV. REGULATING CONSCIENCE, RESTRICTING CHOICE
By using broad or simply vague definitions to "define" key terms in
the federal conscience clauses, the PCR inappropriately expands the
rights of providers to refuse to provide care. Section A will contextu-
alize these changes by proposing that conscience clauses can be under-
stood to represent a "zero-sum game,' 1 ' 7 in which the right to access
healthcare is reduced when the opportunities to refuse are ex-
panded." 8 Section B proposes a simple framework for analyzing con-
science clauses and examines the actual text of the current regulation
by using this framework; it concludes that the PCR effects a shift to-
ward a "facilitator model" of conscience protection. 119 Section C will
address conflicts between the PCR and other federal laws and federal
regulations, including Title VII, the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act (EMTALA), and the regulations written to implement
Title X.120
114. Stormans v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 987 (9th Cir. 2009).
115. See Letter from the Wash. Legislative Office of the Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note
90, at 4-7.
116. These questions are discussed further below. See infra Part IV.B.
117. "Zero-sum games represent circumstances in which the gain of one participant is the loss
of another...." OXFORD DICrIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 237 (John Scott & Gordon Marshall eds.
2005).
118. See infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 131-155 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 156-192 and accompanying text.
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A. Conscience Clauses As a Zero-Sum Game
Whereas rights such as those guaranteed under the Fourth Amend-
ment (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures) 121 or the
Eighth Amendment (freedom from cruel and unusual punishment) 22
are asserted by individuals vis-A-vis the government, conscience
clauses occupy a unique place in the law because of the "absence of
the traditional individual-versus-state paradigm."'1 23 Every conscience
clause draws a line where the provider's right to refuse meets the pa-
tient's right to receive care. Neither of these "rights" is protected by
the Constitution: the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious
conduct,124 and the right to abortion encompasses merely the right to
be free from interference with abortion access, not an affirmative right
to be provided with care. 25 But both the "right to refuse" and the
"right to access" reproductive healthcare are closely related to these
constitutionally protected rights. Reproductive rights advocates thus
view conscience clauses, to the extent that they decrease access to
healthcare services, as infringing on patients' rights.12 6 Advocates for
more expansive conscience clauses, on the other hand, view con-
science clauses as a necessary component of religious freedom and
assert that they should not be required to give up this right in order to
practice their chosen occupation. 27
When framed in this way, the debate over conscience clauses be-
comes a zero-sum game: when a conscience clause grants healthcare
providers the right to refuse to provide services under certain circum-
stances, the right of patients to access those services under those cir-
cumstances is taken away-the patient loses something real, if not
tangible. This model reflects the understanding that the tug-of-war
over conscience clauses is not about the provision versus the withhold-
ing of healthcare services, but about the opportunity to object versus
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123. Dennies Varughese, Conscience Misbranded: Introducing the Performer v. Facilitator
Model for Determining the Suitability of Including Pharmacists Within Conscience Clause Legis-
lation, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 649, 652 (2006).
124. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
125. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977) (holding that the right to abortion does not
include the right to government funding for abortion).
126. See, e.g., Swartz, supra, note 22, at 274.
127. See Kromhout, supra note 35, at 266 (complaining that legislation requiring pharmacists
to dispense contraceptives "forces the professional health care provider to check her conscience
at the pharmacy's door"); Stout, supra note 10 (quoting HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt as say-
ing, "Doctors and other health care providers should not be forced to choose between good
professional standing and violating their conscience").
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the assurance of access to healthcare services-these are the prizes
that are won and lost in direct proportion to each other.
Consider the following hypothetical. The only grocery store located
in Small Town has two store clerks, Ashley and Brian. Ashley objects
to the consumption of meat for moral reasons12 8 She refuses to sell
meat to customers, and her right to do so is protected by a new state
conscience clause. When Brian is working, customers are able to buy
meat, but when Ashley is working alone, they cannot. If Ashley
works alone fifty percent of the time during which the store is open, a
customer traveling to the store during its hours of operation has a fifty
percent chance that she will be able to purchase meat upon arrival.
The value of the store to the consumer as a source of meat is reduced
because access is not assured. The possibility of unilateral refusal thus
constitutes a loss to the consumer (the loss of a reliable source of
meat) that is distinguishable from the event of actual refusal (the loss
of meat on one occasion).
At least two important aspects of the conscience clause debate are
not represented in this hypothetical. First, in theory, the employer
could break the deadlock. Assuming that the state conscience law
prohibits the store from firing Ashley, the grocery store's only option
is to hire another store clerk in order to ensure that someone is always
available to sell meat. If that clerk objects to selling meat, however,
the store would be required to hire a fourth clerk, and so on. The
wisdom of requiring employers to avoid the negative effects of an em-
ployee's refusal by hiring additional employees is certainly a relevant
question, but one that is beyond the scope of this discussion. At this
juncture, it is important merely to note that neither federal conscience
clauses nor the PCR contains any explicit limitation on the number or
extent of accommodations that an employer is required to make
before she is permitted to simply replace the objecting employee. 129
Second, this "zero-sum game" paradigm fails to represent the context
in which refusals actually occur. The extent of the burden caused by
the loss is determined by the availability of other sources for the de-
sired goods. Furthermore, healthcare providers enter into the pro-
vider-patient relationship voluntarily and act as gatekeepers to the
healthcare services for which they are responsible for delivering. Pa-
tients, on the other hand, are compelled to seek care as a result of
128. For an explanation of moral reasons why some people do not eat meat, see People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Cruelty to Animals: Mechanized Madness, http://www.goveg.
com/factoryfarming.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
129. Unlike Title VII, the PCR does not include any "undue burden" limits on the extent to
which an employer must accommodate an objecting employee. See infra Part IV.C.
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mental or physical healthcare needs. The patient depends on the
healthcare provider to use her skills and knowledge to provide appro-
priate care. Thus, some authors have persuasively argued that the na-
ture of this "fiduciary relationship" tips the scales in favor of requiring
the healthcare provider to defer to the patient's needs. 130
The grocery store hypothetical, although admittedly deficient in
some respects, illustrates what is at stake in the conscience clause de-
bate: reliable access. Allowing providers to refuse to provide care
under some circumstances equals the absence of reliable access under
those circumstances, even if providers only exercise their "right to re-
fuse" on some occasions, hence the creation of zero-sum game. Ac-
cess is not reliable when the possibility exists that services will be
denied as the result of a decision unrelated to the needs of the patient.
Conceiving of the debate as one in which the thing at stake, from the
patient's perspective, is healthcare access is important-if not neces-
sary-because the total value of healthcare is necessarily measured in
part by the reliability with which it can be accessed. Quite simply,
healthcare is of little value when accessing it is a crapshoot. Further-
more, as the circumstances under which providers can refuse to pro-
vide healthcare increase, access to healthcare services is directly and
wholly reduced. The PCR should be understood as part of a nation-
wide effort to increase the number of circumstances under which
providers could refuse to provide healthcare. The result of which, in
accordance with this zero-sum paradigm, is the whole loss of access
under those circumstances. The method by which this is accom-
plished, which could be called "strategic ambiguity," is discussed in
the next Section.
B. Vague Terms and "Strategic Ambiguity"
Before examining the text of the PCR, this Section will propose a
simple four-axis framework for analyzing conscience clauses. This
framework, sketched in Sub-section 1, is helpful to understanding how
vague definitions, when used to draft or implement conscience
clauses, exponentially increase the number of circumstances under
which healthcare providers can refuse to provide care.131 Vague terms
create ambiguity, which in turn cuts in favor of healthcare providers.
This, I argue in Sub-section 2, is the triumph of the PCR. Relying on
the four-axis framework, Sub-section 2 argues that the PCR inappro-
priately expands federal conscience protections to encompass objec-
130. See, e.g., Swartz, supra, note 22, at 347.
131. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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tions by healthcare workers with very attenuated relationships to the
healthcare service or procedure that forms the basis of their
objection.1 32
1. A Proposed Framework for Analyzing Conscience Clauses
Conscience clauses that are written in narrow, definite terms draw
clear lines between the rights of providers and the rights of patients.
In contrast, conscience clauses that are written using broad language
vest a seemingly limitless right to refuse in healthcare providers. This
strategic ambiguity can be accomplished in any conscience clause (or
interpretation of a conscience clause) via any one (or more) of four
distinct axes.
All conscience clauses can be understood to have four axes, which
are often, but not always, expressed explicitly as elements. These in-
clude (1) the individuals or entities protected by the law, such as doc-
tors, hospitals, or insurance companies; (2) the healthcare services
that form the basis of the protected objection, such as abortions or
sterilization procedures; (3) the kinds of activities that an individual or
entity can refuse to perform (that is, the minimum proximity between
the objector and the healthcare service); and (4) the reason given for
the objection, such as religious, moral, or ethical reasons.
The language of each of these axes can be manipulated, often with
drastic results. A narrowly written conscience clause vests a right to
refuse in a finite and identifiable group, and it limits to a finite and
identifiable number the circumstances under which the refusal can oc-
cur. For example, a narrowly written clause might provide that doc-
tors can refuse to perform abortions, and that nurses can refuse to
assist doctors in performing abortions. In contrast, a broadly written
clause vests an unlimited right to refuse in an unspecified group of
individuals. For example, a broadly written clause might provide that
"healthcare personnel" can refuse to perform "healthcare services."
Neither providers nor patients have a clear understanding of their
rights under such vaguely written laws. Given that any ambiguity is
likely to cut in favor of providers because of the chilling effect on
employers, this ambiguity can be employed strategically by those in
favor of broad objector protections.
In extreme circumstances, conscience clauses may omit any refer-
ence to one or more of the axes. The absence of that element cuts in
favor of providers. For example, the Weldon Amendment does not
require employees to give any reason-religious or otherwise-for
132. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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their refusal to perform or assist in the performance of abortions.133
Thus, under the terms of the Amendment, employees can refuse to
provide care on the basis of personally held, idiosyncratic beliefs or
theories that are not grounded in either religion or medical science. 134
This example illustrates that unless each of the four axes of a con-
science clause appears as a clearly defined element, the "right to re-
fuse" guaranteed by the clause is, in at least those respects, potentially
limitless. This simple four-axis framework tan therefore be used to
compare and analyze conscience clauses, including federal conscience
clauses as they are affected by the PCR. Specifically, the framework
demonstrates how the use of vaguely defined terms results in limitless
opportunities for providers to refuse to provide care or, from the pa-
tient's perspective, limitless circumstances under which healthcare can
be denied.
2. Some Problems with the PCR: Strategic Ambiguity and the
Increasingly Attenuated Connection Between the Provider
and the "Objectionable" Service
By manipulating the elements of federal conscience clauses, the
PCR increases the circumstances under which healthcare workers can
refuse to perform their duties. The most significant change is accom-
plished through the proximity axis. The proximity axis encompasses
the extent to which a provider can be removed from the actual per-
formance of the purportedly objectionable healthcare service and con-
tinue to enjoy protection for refusing to perform a duty connected to
that service in some way. For example, one may ask whether driving a
patient to the hospital by ambulance for a medically necessary abor-
tion is an activity sufficiently removed from the actual performance of
the abortion, such that the ambulance driver should not be allowed to
refuse to drive the patient to the hospital. 135 Importantly, unlike per-
forming an abortion, the act of driving an ambulance cannot be offen-
sive to the driver unless the driver has independent knowledge that
the patient will be treated with an abortion upon arrival at the hospi-
tal. While the concept of abortion is offensive to the driver, the driver
133. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 507(d)(1), 118 Stat.
2809, 3163 (2004).
134. See Swartz, supra note 22, at 274.
135. See Fellers, supra note 6. There may be other reasons why this sort of refusal right
should not be extended to ambulance drivers-for example, the special nature of their position
as emergency healthcare providers and the resulting risks that refusals can cause under those
circumstances may justify special treatment-but the attenuated connection between these prov-
iders and the ultimate provision of healthcare services is the reason that is the focus of this
analysis.
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is not likely to have a visceral reaction or feeling of repulsion toward
the act of driving.
The Individual Protection Clause (IPC) of the Church Amendment
provides that no individual should be required to "perform or assist in
the performance of any part of a health service program or research
activity" that receives federal funding if doing so would be contrary to
her "religious beliefs or moral convictions. ' 136 The PCR defines the
phrase "assist in the performance"-which represents the proximity
axis of the IPC-to mean "participat[ing] in any activity with a reason-
able connection to a procedure, health service or health service pro-
gram, or research activity.1 137
At first blush, the term "reasonable connection" appears to place a
fair limit on the scope of the phrase "assist in the performance." But
in further explaining the meaning of the term "reasonable connec-
tion," HHS ominously states that such reasonably connected activities
include "counseling, referral, training, and [making] other arrange-
ments" for the provision of healthcare services.138 HHS then offers an
example of an activity that would constitute making "other arrange-
ments" for the provision of healthcare services: "an employee whose
task it is to clean the instruments used in a particular procedure would
be considered to assist in the performance of the particular
procedure."139
This example illustrates how the PCR improperly expands the
scope of federal conscience clauses. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal. A nurse is asked to clean and sterilize the speculum used during
embryo transfer, the final step in an in vitro fertilization procedure.
140
If the nurse finds in vitro fertilization objectionable, the PCR provides
that he can refuse to perform that activity. The PCR does not con-
template that the nurse may be asked to perform this activity an hour
after the procedure was completed, in a different room, or even a dif-
ferent wing of the hospital from where the examination took place.
The nurse may never meet the patient who underwent the procedure.
Asked to clean several sets of instruments within the course of his
shift, the nurse will not be able to distinguish between a speculum
used during an embryo transfer and one used during a prenatal exami-
nation, or between a set of instruments used to impregnate a lesbian
136. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2008).
137. Provider Conscience Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2008) (emphasis added).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274, 50,277 (Aug. 26, 2008).
140. See Am. Pregnancy Ass'n, In Vitro Fertilization: IVF (May 2007), http://www.american
pregnancy.org/infertility/ivf.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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woman and another set used to impregnate a married, heterosexual
woman-although he might find only one of these procedures
objectionable.
This hypothetical, as well as the ambulance driver example, illus-
trates an important distinction between the direct and indirect provi-
sion of healthcare services-a distinction that underlies the entire
debate over the desirable breadth of conscience clauses. With regard
to this distinction, Dennies Varughese advocates for a "performer ver-
sus facilitator model" as the appropriate model for determining which
healthcare employers should be afforded the right to refuse and under
what circumstances: 14 1
Th[e] goal of achieving a balance of the competing interests of relig-
ious liberty of healthcare professionals and reproductive liberty of
women wanting access to contraceptive measures can be achieved
by classifying the healthcare worker as either a performer or
facilitator. When a healthcare professional is designated as a "per-
former," the reasonable objective-of not forcing individuals to
perform an act to which they are opposed-of the initial conscience
clauses applies and, therefore, the professional may invoke the right
to object based on conscience. When the professional is deemed a
"facilitator," however, refusal on the basis of conscience grossly ex-
ceeds merely protecting the professional, and rather, acts as a proxy
in the war against reproductive freedom by imposing unnecessary
obstacles to essential and legal medical options for women.142
Significantly, the concept of facilitation is almost synonymous with the
concept of "making arrangements for" healthcare services. At the
heart of the problem with the PCR, therefore, is the absence of any
distinction between direct and indirect involvement in the purportedly
objectionable procedure. In the absence of distinctions based on the
proximity of the provider to the service, no difference exists between
the "man who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is
used by a factory to make instruments used in abortions"'143 and the
doctor who performs them.
The increased attenuation between the objecting provider and the
purportedly objectionable service is confirmed by a more subtle
change that involves the reason axis of the IPC. In the IPC, a refusal
is protected if the "perform[ance] or assist[ance] in the performance"
of an activity would offend the objector's "religious beliefs or moral
convictions. 1 44 Without explanation, HHS rewrites this phrase, stat-
141. Varughese, supra note 123, at 683.
142. Id. at 683-84 (emphasis added). Varughese, while a law student at the time of publica-
tion, is also a licensed pharmacist. Id. at 703.
143. Wilson, supra note 1, at 58 (citing 41 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 478 (1976)).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2008).
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ing that a refusal is protected if the "service or activity" offends the
objector's "religious beliefs or moral convictions. ' 145 The reorienta-
tion of these clauses has significant implications. With this change, the
PCR shifts focus away from the offensiveness purportedly associated
with performing or assisting in the performance of a service and in-
stead emphasizes the offensiveness purportedly associated with the
service itself-the procedure or treatment-conceived of in the
abstract.
In fact, in the introduction to a previous draft of the PCR, HHS
acknowledges this shift, stating that it sought "to avoid judging
whether a particular action is genuinely offensive to an individual. 146
This statement-which endorses what I termed the "subjective test"
used by the Ohio judge and the district court in Stormans1 47-begs the
question: If the objector is not genuinely offended by the action that
he is refusing to perform, what is the purpose of allowing the objec-
tion? The answer appears to be that, rather than creating a shield to
protect conscientious objectors from being forced to perform activities
that they find repugnant, the PCR seeks to create a sword for pro-life
activists to wield in the war against reproductive freedom.1 48
This shift toward protecting facilitators, or those with only a very
attenuated connection to the purportedly objectionable service, is also
accomplished through the portion of the PCR that implements the
Coats and Weldon Amendments, specifically through a change to the
entity axes of these Amendments. The Coats and Weldon Amend-
ments define "healthcare entities" to include physicians and health-
care professionals. 149 The PCR defines the phrase "healthcare entity"
to include not only professionals but also "healthcare personnel. 15 0
HHS attempts to undercut any argument that this is a substantive
change in the law, rather than a mere clarification, by (correctly) stat-
ing, in the federal register notice that accompanied publication of the
145. Provider Conscience Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 88.4 (2008).
146. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274, 50,277 (Aug. 26, 2008) (emphasis
added).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
148. This distinction has been recognized in other contexts. For example, there is nothing
inherently morally offensive about paying taxes, even if that money is later used to fund war.
For this reason, we recognize the right of draftees or soldiers to conscientiously object to taking
part in acts of war, but we do not recognize the right of taxpayers to opt out of paying taxes
when a portion of their taxes funds the same war. Of course, an individual can still refuse to
make such a contribution precisely because she hopes to affect the actions of others; such an
action would appropriately be termed a boycott, and a similar strategy is arguably at work here.
149. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 507(d)(2), 118 Stat. 2809,
3163 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 238n(c)(2) (2008).
150. Provider Conscience Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2008).
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PCR, that neither statute provides an exhaustive list of such health-
care entities. 151 This argument is not persuasive because of the limita-
tions inherent in the term "healthcare professional." The term
"professional" connotes a certain level of internal monitoring, such as
qualifications for membership, licensing schemes, and ethical guide-
lines. 152 The term "personnel," on the other hand, is a generic term
synonymous with "employee.' ' 153 The latter term encompasses pro-
fessionals as well as other healthcare workers. For example, volun-
teers and receptionists employed by a hospital, although they are not
healthcare professionals subject to any licensing scheme or ethical
standards, can accurately be described as healthcare personnel. Thus,
adding "personnel" to this list is not like adding "bananas" to a list
that includes "apples" and "oranges," but rather more like adding the
term "food" to that list. The intent to encompass all "food" is hardly
apparent from a list that includes "apples" and "oranges," even
though the list is admittedly not all-inclusive. Significantly, non-pro-
fessional employees are less likely than healthcare professionals to be
directly involved in providing care and more likely to be involved in
merely "making arrangements" for the provision of care, such as mak-
ing appointments. Thus, this change also contributes to the PCR's
shift toward a "facilitator model" of conscience protection.
The expansion of conscience protections to those with only an at-
tenuated relationship to the "objectionable" service limits the role of
professional associations in ensuring that patients are treated in a pro-
fessional manner. A recent case, Noesen v. Department of Regulation
and Licensing, illustrates the important role that professional associa-
tions play in balancing the rights of providers and patients in accor-
dance with professional ethical standards. 154 In that case, the
Wisconsin Department of Regulations disciplined a pharmacist after
he refused to fill a patient's prescription for birth control and then
refused to relay the information necessary to transfer the prescription
to a willing pharmacist at another pharmacy. 155 This case illustrates
151. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072, 78076 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 88.2 (2008)).
152. According to Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, a "professional" is a person "char-
acterized by conforming to the technical or ethical standards of a profession." Merriam-Web-
ster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
153. According to Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, the term "personnel" signifies "a
body of persons usually employed (as in a factory, office, organization)." See id. Thus, while the
central feature of a profession is "standards," personnel are defined simply as persons who are
employed, that is, employees. See id.
154. Noesen v. State Dep't of Regulation and Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 751
N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
155. See id. at 389-90.
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that ethical review boards and professional organizations can provide
the first line of defense against refusals that are beyond the pale of
acceptable professional conduct. By extending conscience protections
to all "healthcare personnel," the PCR removes this balancing mecha-
nism and vests an absolute and unchecked right to refuse in all em-
ployees working in the healthcare industry.
Although there may be other problems created by the lengthy PCR,
the purpose of this Section is merely to recognize that the PCR makes
a shift toward a "facilitator model" as the term was used by
Varughese, to recognize that it does so by using vague language to
define key terms, and to sketch out some of the implications of that
shift. The four-axis framework laid out in this Section may assist in
further analysis of the PCR or its successor, as well other conscience
clauses, because it provides a simple mechanism for comparison. The
next Section will discuss some of the conflicts between the PCR and
other laws and regulations.
C. Conflict with Federal Laws and Regulations
Unlike some state conscience clauses, 156 none of the federal con-
science clauses create an explicit private right of action. 157 Thus, the
only remedies available in federal courts for healthcare objectors who
believe that they have experienced "discrimination" because of their
156. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/12 (West 2008).
157. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 238n, 300a-7(d) (2008); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004). Two federal district courts recently ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Church Amendment contains an implied private right of action.
See Nead v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006);
Moncivaiz v. DeKalb County, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 WL 539994 (N.D. I11. Mar. 12, 2004). Both
courts concluded that it does not. See Nead, 2006 WL 1582454, at *5; Moncivaiz, 2004 WL
539994, at *3; cf. Eisenstadt, supra note 39, at 155 (arguing, before the Moncivaiz and Nead
opinions were issued, that courts should recognize an implied private right of action in the
Church Amendment). Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center has been cited for the proposition that
the Church Amendment creates an implicit private right of action. See, e.g., Bruce G. Davis,
Defining the Employment Rights of Medical Personnel Within the Parameters of Personal Con-
science, 1986 DETROIT C.L. REV. 847, 861 (1986) (citing 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975)). But that
conclusion is dubious, even in the absence of the recent Illinois decisions holding otherwise. The
doctor in Watkins brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, and the lower court denied
relief. See Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 364 F. Supp. 799, 800-01, 803 (1973). The lower court
also noted, however, that the Church Amendment forbade discrimination against individuals on
the basis of their views on abortions or their willingness to perform them. Id. at 803. But it is
unclear whether the doctor brought his initial suit under the Church Amendment or, alterna-
tively, whether the lower court raised the issue sua sponte. In any event, the issue was not
before the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See Watkins, 520 F.2d at 895-96. In short, the clear and
recent rejection of the proposition that the Church Amendment contains an implicit private right




refusal to provide care are those available pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.158 Title VII prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against employees based on the employee's "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."'1 59 Title VII applies to all employers
with fifteen or more employees, including but not limited to employ-
ers in the healthcare industry.160 Significantly, the law takes a bal-
anced approach with regard to accommodating religious objections in
the workplace. 161 The law requires employers to offer reasonable ac-
commodations to objecting employees only to the extent that provid-
ing such accommodations does not impose an undue hardship on the
employer or co-workers. 162 For example, in Shelton v. University of
Medicine and Dentistry, a labor and delivery nurse refused to assist a
pregnant woman during a life-threatening emergency because the fe-
tus was not expected to survive the necessary procedure. 63 After the
incident, the hospital offered to transfer the nurse from the emergency
room to the newborn intensive care unit.1 64 When the nurse refused,
the hospital fired her.1 65 The Shelton court held that the hospital's
offer of accommodation was reasonable, and it dismissed the nurse's
Title VII claim. 166
Thus, these balancing mechanisms-that the accommodation need
only be reasonable, and need only be offered to the extent that no
undue burden is imposed on the employer-allow employers in the
healthcare industry to limit the detrimental impact of a provider's re-
fusal on co-workers, patients, and themselves. Federal conscience
clauses do not contain any balancing mechanisms: they seemingly cre-
ate an absolute "right to refuse." Nor do they provide a private right
of action. 167 Title VII, with its accompanying balancing mechanisms,
rather than conscience clauses, has therefore (thus far) provided the
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2008); Swartz, supra note 22, at 303.
159. § 2000e-2.
160. § 2000e(b).
161. Letter from Stuart J. Ishimaru & Christine M. Griffin, Comm'rs, U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n, to the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 25, 2008), http://
op.bna.com/eg.nsf/id/pdon-7jyqkh (select the icon labeled "EEOC letter to HHS.pdf") (citing
Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004)).
162. See Swartz, supra note 22, at 303; Amy Bergquist, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (with)
Religious Accommodation Under Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1080-84 (2006) (discussing
the accommodation requirements under Title VII).
163. See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 226.
167. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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legal standard establishing the extent and limits of a healthcare objec-
tor's right to refuse, at least at the federal level. 168
After reviewing the PCR, an attorney for the U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged
with enforcing Title VII, determined that the PCR overlaps with Title
VII.169 As a result, the attorney concluded in his letter to HHS that
the PCR "is unnecessary for protection of employees and applicants,
is potentially confusing to the regulated community, and will impose a
burden on covered employers, particularly small employers.' 170 The
Guttmacher Institute, a non-profit organization that researches and
reports on issues related to reproductive rights, 17a reached a similar
conclusion. 172 In its response to the PCR, the Institute pointed out
that, because HHS took such an "absolutist standpoint" on the right
to refuse and "failed to even hint at any ethical or legal limits of con-
scientious refusal," the PCR "contradicts Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act." 173
Patient care is even more directly endangered by the omission of
any mention in the PCR of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the federal law that requires providers
to assist in a genuine medical emergency, regardless of their moral or
religious objections. 174 Several reproductive rights organizations have
voiced their concerns over this omission, arguing that, at a minimum,
the omission will cause confusion within the healthcare industry over
the applicable law.175 Again, this omission works to the advantage of
objecting providers and places patients in the extremely precarious
position of not knowing whether, when they arrive at the hospital
seeking emergency care, they will be met by a willing provider or a
provider attempting to assert her right, pursuant to the PCR, to refuse
to assist them, even in a medical emergency.
168. See Letter from Reed L. Russell, Legal Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, to the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2-3 (Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with author)
(explaining that "Title VII provides the legal framework under which complaints of employment
discrimination based on religion ... have been judged for over forty years").
169. See id. at 2.
170. Id.
171. Guttmacher Inst., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.guttmacher.orglabout/faq.
html (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
172. See Camp, supra note 17.
173. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (2006).
175. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., supra note 17; see also Letter from Family Planning
Advocates of N.Y. State, supra note 90 (asking HHS to declare that the PCR was meant to be
interpreted in conjunction with EMTALA and explaining that, although rare, "women do at
times experience life-threatening pregnancy complications that require immediate treatment").
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In response to these concerns, HHS wrote, "Commenters mistak-
enly confuse certain legal requirements on institutions or health care
entities as requirements on individual providers. ' 176 HHS is correct
that EMTALA binds hospitals receiving federal funding, not employ-
ees of such facilities. 177 But HHS fails to recognize the inherent prac-
tical difficulties in making such a distinction. If a hospital is required
to treat in an emergency, but none of its staff members can be legally
required to do so, the hospital will only be able to ensure compliance
to the extent that its employees happen to personally agree with fed-
eral law. Again, the similarity to the "subjective test" is apparent. 178
In the federal register notice, HHS off-handedly remarks that it is
"not aware of any instance where a facility required to provide emer-
gency care under EMTALA was unable to do so because its entire
staff objected to the service on religious or moral grounds. 1 79 But as
the Shelton case' 0 demonstrates, the refusal of even one nurse can
delay the provision of emergency care, putting the hospital at risk of
liability and the patient at risk of physical harm. While Title VII's
balanced approach would allow hospitals to solve such problems, for
example by transferring objecting employees or firing them as neces-
sary, the PCR does not include such balancing mechanisms. The fail-
ure of the PCR to affirm that the provision of emergency care must
come before individual employees' "rights to refuse" evidences a bla-
tant disregard for the well-being of patients.
Finally, the PCR also conflicts with Title X regulations. Title X is
the federal program that provides grants to non-profit organizations
that provide family planning services.181 Recipients of Title X funding
provide family planning services, including contraceptives, to women
who would not otherwise be able to afford reproductive healthcare. 182
As a condition of funding, Title X recipients must provide pregnant
patients with information about all of their reproductive options, in-
cluding abortion.183 Thus, the PCR and Title X regulations conflict to
the extent that recipients of Title X funds are required, on one hand,
176. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,087 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2008)).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (2006).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 105-114 for a discussion of what I term the "subjec-
tive test."
179. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,087 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2008)).
180. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
181. Office of Population Affairs, Family Planning, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/familyplanning/in-
dex.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
182. See id.
183. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5).
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to ensure that patients receive counseling and referrals for abortion
and, on the other hand, to ensure that employees can refuse to per-
form these services if they so choose.184 Commenters raised this im-
portant concern. 185 In response, HHS determined that the PCR will
take priority over the Title X regulations:18 6
With regards to the Title X program, Commenters are correct that
the current regulatory requirement that grantees must provide
counseling and referrals for abortion upon request (42 CFR
59.5(a)(5)) is inconsistent with the health care provider conscience
protection statutory provisions and this regulation. The Office of
Population Affairs, which administers the Title X program, is aware
of this conflict with the statutory requirements and, as such, would
not enforce this Title X regulatory requirement on objecting grant-
ees or applicants.1 87
Thus, in a rare moment of clarity, the HHS decisively gave the pa-
tient's right to access care-here, simply access to information-a
backseat to the provider's right to refuse.
As a result of this significant change in the law, "crisis pregnancy
centers"-health clinics run with a strictly pro-life agenda 188-will
face fewer obstacles to obtaining federal funds. Although crisis preg-
nancy centers purport to provide abortion counseling and, therefore,
have had some success in claiming eligibility for Title X funding in the
past, they have been sharply criticized on the basis that the informa-
tion they provide about abortion is often misleading, erroneous, or
simply wrong. 189 At least some of these centers actively attempt to
mislead women by concealing their pro-life agenda.1 90 Tactics used by
these centers include listing themselves in the phonebook under
184. Prior to the passage of the Weldon Amendment, critics worried that the Amendment
would have this effect. In National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association v.
Gonzalez, the D.C. Circuit held that the Weldon Amendment and Title X regulations did not
necessarily conflict. See 468 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("Despite the apparently similar
potential for conflict between the pre-Weldon conscience provisions and the current Title X regu-
lation (dating from 2000), they have enjoyed a quite peaceful co-existence." (emphasis added)).
185. See Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,087 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. § 88.1 (2008)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CEN-
TERS (2009) (on file with author) (discussing the phenomena of these pro-life centers, termed
"crisis pregnancy centers," which seek to "intentionally misinform and mislead women seeking
pregnancy-related information with the intention of dissuading them from exercising their right
to choose").
189. A report issued by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in 2006
found that "87 percent of federally funded pregnancy centers [in the study] provided false or
misleading information about abortion." Judy Peres, To Foes, Pregnancy Sites Blur the Abortion
Picture, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2007, § 1, at 1.
190. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 188, at 1-2.
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"abortion services," choosing names similar to those of nearby abor-
tion clinics, locating themselves near abortion clinics, and falsely in-
forming callers that they provide a full range of reproductive
healthcare services. 191 For example, one pregnancy center, located in
the same row of storefronts as an abortion clinic, posted a sign that
said "Women for Choice" on the door.192 Under the new regulation,
these centers are now able to receive federal funding. Thus, with re-
gard to crisis pregnancy centers, the PCR again does more than up-
hold the right of a provider to decline to provide a service that it finds
objectionable: it effectively condones the activities of these crisis preg-
nancy centers, which are specifically designed to create obstacles to
the delivery of reproductive healthcare to women.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzes the PCR, which is currently under review
by the Obama Administration. As currently written, the PCR
promises to have devastating effects on the healthcare system. Ac-
cording to HHS's own estimates, the PCR will affect approximately
571,947 healthcare entities, including 58,109 pharmacies; 4,936 hospi-
tals; and 234,200 private physician's offices. 193 HHS estimates that it
will cost approximately $43.6 million per year to implement the
PCR.194
In addition to these quantifiable expenses, numerous non-quantifi-
able costs will result from implementing the PCR. The threatened
loss of funding for failure to comply is likely to have a chilling effect
on employers who will act cautiously with regard to objecting employ-
ees, acquiescing to employees' expansive interpretations of the PCR
rather than seeking clarification in the courts and risking funding. 195
In other words, as written, the PCR pressures employers to adopt the
"subjective test." As a result, patients will experience a reduction of
access to healthcare services. From the patient's perspective, this re-
duction represents a whole loss, making conscience clauses into zero-
sum games, in which the thing that is lost is not services but access to
services.
Importantly, the impact of the PCR on patients will be felt un-
evenly. Patients without health insurance, with inadequate health in-
surance, with poor transportation, or with other barriers to care, as
191. Id.
192. Peres, supra note 189.
193. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,094-95.
194. Id. at 78,095.
195. See 7 States Sue Government over U.S. Abortion Rule, supra note 19.
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well as patients who lack the ability to communicate adeptly in the
dominant language, will not be able to take advantage of the opportu-
nity to discharge a provider whose religious or political views, they
may discover, are not compatible with their own. Commenters have
predicted that the PCR will be used to discriminate against patients
based on their sexual orientation. 196 And because reproductive
healthcare remains so controversial in this country, women will be dis-
proportionately disadvantaged by the PCR, which now allows almost
all employees-not only the doctor, but potentially the nurse, the
pharmacist, the pharmacist's assistant, the receptionist, the ambulance
driver, and the janitor-to have a say in whether she can access her
chosen healthcare without interference.
The PCR brought the ongoing debate over conscience clauses into
the national spotlight. Although the version of the PCR that is ana-
lyzed in this Comment may soon be revised by the Obama Adminis-
tration, the four-axis framework adopted in this Comment provides a
simple mechanism for future analysis of conscience clauses and the
regulations that interpret them. In addition, this Comment argues
that any analysis of conscience clauses must recognize that what is at
stake is access to healthcare services, and that reduction of healthcare
access can be accomplished not only explicitly, for example through
the explicit redefining of the term "abortion," but also through "stra-
tegic ambiguity."
In order to protect healthcare access for all patients, the Obama
Administration should seek to promulgate regulations that clearly de-
fine the scope of federal conscience clauses and that do not conflict
with the important protections for patients that are provided by other
federal laws and regulations.
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